Ghana’s 2018 banking sector crisis: The role of corporate governance factors by Torku, King




ASHESI UNIVERSITY COLLEGE 
 
Ghana’s 2018 Banking Sector Crisis: The Role of Corporate Governance Factors 
By:  





Undergraduate dissertation submitted to the Department of Business Administration, 
Ashesi University College. Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the 






ACTIONS OF MANAGERS AND SHAREHOLDERS ii 
DECLARATION 
I hereby declare that this dissertation is the result of my own original work and that no 
part of it has been presented for another degree in this university or elsewhere.  
Candidate’s signature: .............................................  
Candidate’s name: King Torku  
Date: Monday, 11th May 2020 
I hereby declare that the preparation and presentation of the dissertation were 
supervised in accordance with the guidelines on supervision of dissertation, laid down 
by Ashesi University College.  
Supervisor’s signature: ..................................................  
Supervisor’s name:  




ACTIONS OF MANAGERS AND SHAREHOLDERS iii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
To start off I would like to express my gratitude to God for making this thesis a 
success. Next, I would like to express my immense gratitude to my knowledgeable 
supervisor, Ms. Esther Laryea for her invaluable insight and direction throughout this 
process. This study could not have been completed without her much appreciated 
guidance.  
I would also like to extend my gratitude to my family for their constant support and 
encouragement throughout this dissertation process. Finally, to all my friends who 






ACTIONS OF MANAGERS AND SHAREHOLDERS iv 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
   
Abbreviation Meaning  
BFT Business and Financial Times 
BoG Bank of Ghana 
CAR Capital Adequacy Ratio 
IFC International Finance Corporation 
M&As Mergers and Acquisitions 
NPLs Non-Performing Loans 
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
CEO Chief Executive Officer 
ACTIONS OF MANAGERS AND SHAREHOLDERS v 
ABSTRACT 
Discussions and analysis’ after the 2018 banking crisis have placed the burden of 
blame on both managers of the failed institutions and the Bank of Ghana. This study 
intended to investigate issues with the manner of corporate governance employed by 
leaders of the collapsed institutions and how these factors contributed to the banking 
crisis.  
A total of 186 newspapers between 2017 and 2019 were scanned for insight regarding 
the direct actions of managers and shareholders that led to the collapse of their banks 
during the 2018 Ghanaian banking crisis. 58 texts were identified, and a content 
analysis was conducted. The actions were also analyzed and categorized using the 
IFC’s corporate governance methodology. This study provides valuable insight 
regarding the actions of bank managers and shareholders and how these actions 
caused the collapse of their banks. 
The actions of managers and shareholders leading to the crisis included: interrelated 
lending, loan approval without the necessary process, granting of loans earning no 
interest, lending to risky borrowers, breaching the single obligor limit, the use of 
depositors’ funds as personal funds, shareholder excessive control of managers, 
exaggerating investments, overstating  loans and advances to customers, fabricating 
investments, re-engineering capital, misuse of BoG liquidity support, use of bank 
funds to pay off obligations in related companies, infrequent board meetings, non-
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
According to Prunac (2015), Banks are both a symptom of, and a foundation 
for economic health. A country’s level of productivity depends largely on the 
fortitude and efficiency of its banks (Ikhide, 2009). The basis for the construction of 
banks is to promote financial collaboration by redirecting funds from the surplus 
segment to the deficient segment of the economy (Oluitan, 2014). Banks are able to 
promote economic activity by essentially serving as intermediaries between lenders 
and borrowers. In the case of developing countries such as Ghana, small-scale 
businesses who are likely to have difficulties in accessing capital for expansion, can 
easily look to banks for financing (Ikhide, 2009). By redirecting funds, banks create a 
system where enterprises can grow and expand their operations. These expansions 
lead to increased economic activity in the economy.  
Again, in the case of developing countries, Kassim and Majid (2008) found 
that not only is there a direct correlation between bank loans and real economic 
activity, but banks also serve as an instrument of monetary policy implementation. 
Consequently, the frailty of the banking industry will adversely affect the real 
economy and thus, promoting a robust and stable banking system is a prerequisite for 
economic sustainability (Kassim and Majid, 2008).  
Banking in Africa 
According to a 2015 report by the AfDB, Sub-Saharan Africa is reported to 
have had the lowest financial depth (24%) when compared to other world regions. 
Financial depth for the report was measured by matching domestic credit to the 
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private sector, as a percentage of GDP. (AfDB, 2015). Additionally, the lowest 
financial depth value for the region was recorded by West Africa (20.3%). Challenges 
in evaluating borrowers’ credit history, repayment ability and a general absence of the 
adequate systematic requirements are among some of the reasons for the region’s low 
financial depth. Per AfDB’s 2015 report, less than 3% of adults in West Africa are 
listed on a public credit registry. A phenomenon that makes lending difficult for 
banks. Banks in Sub-Saharan are faced with a myriad of issues such as a limited 
national consumer base, meager earning levels and inefficient legal systems 
(European Investment Bank, 2013).  
2017 data from The Global Economy (2019) establishes Equatorial Guinea as 
the African country with the highest percentage of NPLs (27.2%). With 25.8% of its 
loans being described as non-performing, Chad had the second highest percentage of 
non-performing loans. South Africa and Namibia recorded the lowest percentage of 
NPLs with 2.84 % and 2.49% respectively. The continent’s average for the year was 
11.6%. Ghana had the fourth highest NPL ratio in Africa and the eighth highest ratio 
in the world according to The World Bank (2019).  The global average of NPLs in 
2017 was 7.44 % (The Global Economy, 2019), this when compared to Africa’s 
average of 11.6% underscores the challenges being faced by the continents financial 
sector.  
Banking in Ghana 
Banks began operating in the Gold Coast during the colonial era primarily to 
offer monetary support to British businesses. 1896 saw the Bank of British West 
Africa (currently known as Standard Chartered Bank) open its first branch in Accra. 
The conducive economic environment lured other foreign banks to start their 
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operations in the country as well. Between 1920 to 1950 The Bank of British West 
Africa and Barclays Bank were the only functioning banks in the country. The first 
local bank (The Ghana Commercial Bank) began operations in 1953 to decrease the 
control by foreign banks. Shortly after independence in 1957, the Bank of Ghana was 
established to regulate the Ghana’s currency and banking industry. By 1974, a 
number of Development Financial Institutions (DFIs) had been established to provide 
services being overlooked by commercial banks. These DFIs included the Social 
Security Bank, Merchant Bank, Agricultural Development Bank among others.  
Banks existing between 1960 and 1970 were noted to either be wholly or 
majority owned by the public sector. This led to the government undertaking a 
campaign to privatize the sector in 1992. This move resulted in an increase in the 
number of domestic and foreign banks in the country. “The liberalization of the 
financial sector under the Financial Sector Adjustment Program (FINSAP) and 
Financial Sector Strategic Plan (FINSSIP) also brought about improved savings, 
enhanced deposit mobilization, financial deepening, and competition in the banking 
industry” (IIAS, 2015, para 3). There was also the implementation of the new 
Banking Act of 2004 which eradicated secondary reserves and modified the minimum 
capital requirement. The minimum capital requirement was then increased from GHS 
60 million in 2007 to GHS 100 million in 2013.  
By the end of December 2016, Ghana’s banking sector continued to show 
signs of tenacity. The industry’s total assets had increased by 29.8% to GHS 96.52 
billion from GHS 74.38 billion in the same period in 2015 (Bank of Ghana, 2017). 
The Bank of Ghana described the banking sector as being quite stable despite the high 
ratio of gross Non- Heritage Bank were granted licenses to being operating as 
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commercial banks. These additions brought the total number of Deposit Money Banks 
to 33. 
The profitability of the industry however, decreased in 2016. This was evident 
from the various profitability indicators for the industry. The industry’s return on 
equity declined from 21.4% (2015) to 17.3% (2016). Similarly, return on assets also 
declined from 4.5% to 3.8% as did the return on earning assets from 6.1% in 2015 to 
5.1% in 2016 (Bank of Ghana, 2018). High interest costs and a rising non-performing 
loan ratio were blamed for this.  
In 2017, the competence of some of Ghana’s banks were called into question 
as the country’s stock of non-performing loans stood at 19.7% (PwC, 2018). This 
high percentage of loan defaults led to lenders adopting more rigid credit policies 
such that, even with a reduction in the lending base rate from 25.5% (2016) to 20% 
(2017), the total value of loans and advances declined by 10% for the period (PwC, 
2018). 
According to The World Bank (2019), “a bank loan can be classified as 
nonperforming when payments of principal and interest are 90 days or more past due, 
or when future payments are not expected to be received in full”. Non-performing 
loans are extremely relevant as they are indicative of the banking industry’s asset and 
credit quality. “Understanding the factors that influence the level of NPLs is crucial 
for the risk management function of banks and for national bank supervisors 
responsible for banking stability” (Ozili, 2019). Ozili (2019) again found that NPLs 
positively correlate with banking concentration and banking crisis and negatively 
correlate with regulatory capital and bank liquidity. High NPLs negatively affect 
banks’ profits as the interest income for loans is the primary source of revenue for 
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banks. They further reduce the ability of banks to lend to borrowers who invest in 
their enterprises to help grow the economy.  
The plague of high non-performing loans in Ghana’s banking industry has 
been attributed to the high operating costs owing to the increased cost of energy and 
input materials. The inability of the government to pay back loans for construction 
projects was also been identified as a reason for the high number of loan defaults 
(Boachie, 2016). However, Akrong (2017) blamed the “irresponsible credit decision” 
of lenders for the phenomenon. The commerce and finance sector was the highest 
receiver of industry loans for 2016, with 24.5% of all loans being directed to the 
sector. Correspondingly, it also had the highest percentage of non-performing loans. 
The Bank of Ghana 
It would be impractical to analyse the corporate governance errs of the 
banking sector without giving a brief overview of the industry’s regulator and its 
functions. The Bank of Ghana (BoG) is the central bank of Ghana and has “overall 
supervisory and regulatory authority in all matters relating to banking and non-
banking financial business, with the purpose of achieving a sound efficient banking 
system in the interest of depositors and the economy as a whole ” (Bank of Ghana, 
2020, Regulatory Framework section, para. 1). The essential functions of the bank are 
laid down in act 612 of the 2002 Bank of Ghana Act and these inform the bank’s 
mandate which generally requires a stringent regulation of the country’s banking 
sector. Its regulatory operations are constructed in accordance with the Basel Core 
Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (Bank of Ghana, 2020). 
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The Crisis 
In August 2017, Ghana Commercial Bank (GCB) took over both UT and 
Capital Bank. This take-over signified the advent of what was to be a tedious 
transitionary period for Ghana’s Banking sector. As at August 2017, 35 commercial 
banks were licensed to operate in the country. Fast-forward just two years later, this 
number reduced to 23. This drastic reduction does not fully represent the intriguing 
happenings that transpired within the two-year period.  
The increment in the central bank’s minimum capital requirement from GHS 
120 million to GHS 400 million in September 2017 provoked 16 banks to acquire 
fresh capital injections or capitalize their income surplus’. Applications for mergers 
were also granted. Specifically, the mergers were between First Atlantic and Energy 
Commission bank, Omni Bank and Sahel-Sahara, and First National Bank and GHL 
Bank. Each of the three resulting banks from the mergers successfully met the new 
capital requirement deadline. 
The Collapsed Banks 
The Bank of Ghana revoked the licenses of seven banks namely: The Beige 
Bank, Premium Bank, The Royal Bank, The Sovereign Bank, Heritage Bank, 
Construction Bank and Unibank. These banks were merged to form The Consolidated 
Bank Ghana, a BoG created institution, to manage the failed banks. Unibank’s license 
was revoked in 2017 after its capital adequacy ratio fell below the 10% minimum rate. 
The Beige and Construction Bank were said to have acquired their license based on 
falsified information and also happened to be insolvent. The Royal Bank was found to 
be immensely undercapitalized as measures to return them back to solvency proved 
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futile. Capital Bank was tagged as insolvent as its liabilities overshadowed its assets. 
The bank also had huge sums of uncollectible debts leading to its collapse. 
In the period following the clean-up, the burden of blame has constantly been 
tossed on the back of Ghana’s central bank (The Bank of Ghana) and the manner of 
corporate governance that was employed by the failed banks. Aside from poor 
corporate governance and regulation failures, Banahene (2018) also identified a 
disregard of ethics and values as additional reasons for the sector’s failure. These 
claims have failed to definitively conclude on the actions of managers and 
shareholders that led to the failure and how the country’s banks can be better 
managed to prevent another systemic failure. 
1.2 Motivation and Problem Statement 
Ghana, like most African countries, has an underdeveloped financial system. 
The strength and robustness of Ghana’s banking industry cannot be compared to that 
of developed nations. This reality was adequately reaffirmed by Atuahene (2016) who 
noted that “Ghana’s banking sector is relatively less efficient and less experienced for 
asset and liability management” and thus efficient management and control are even 
more crucial in “establishing a sound banking system” (p.40). 
Cultivating a system of trust in the finance industry is a critical component in 
the development of the financial sector. It has been argued that the crisis faced by the 
finance industry is one that has negatively impacted public confidence in financial 
institutions. The subsequent wave of panic withdrawals to hit the country have been 
said to do more harm than good to the finance sector and the economy as a whole. 
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According to a report by Graphic Online (2019), rural banks lost millions of cedis 
from panic withdrawals.  
Again, the cost involved in ‘cleaning’ the sector served as motivation for this 
research. GHS 12.7 billion represents approximately 17% of the planned GHS 74.6 
billion expenditure figure. There are endless Ghanaian sectors and problems this 
amount of money could have greatly improved. I was therefore interested in 
understanding the actions of managers and shareholders in contributing to the crisis. 
According to Atuilik (2018), poor corporate governance is to blame for the 
banking crisis. Similarly, the Asantehene in 2018, blamed the Bank of Ghana for the 
crisis per a report by BusinessGhana. These ideas typify the debate surrounding the 
crisis. Individuals across the political divide have blamed various factors for the crisis 
faced by the banking sector. Two major stakeholders have been recurrent in the 
narrative that has echoed diverse views on who should be held liable. The industry 
regulator, that is, the Bank of Ghana, and the nature of corporate governance 
employed in the failed institutions. Various studies have delved in to analyze the 
faults of each party on a surface level. These analyses are usually a result of the 
political alignment of the analyst.  
More often than not, these claims tend to be bare opinions with little to no research 
done. The claims also fail to reveal the actions that constituted corporate governance 
malpractices and their role in the crisis.  
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1.3 Research Questions 
1. How was Ghana’s 2018 banking crisis a consequence of corporate governance 
malpractices and what direct actions by managers and shareholders can be 
linked to the collapse of their institutions? 
2. Under which areas of the IFC’s corporate governance framework can the 
actions and inactions of managers and shareholders, leading to the collapse of 
their banks, be categorized and evaluated? 
 
1.4 Research Objectives 
The overarching objective of this study is to investigate the role of poor corporate 
governance structures in the banks’ failures. 
The specific objectives of this study are posted below: 
I. To identify the actions of managers which contributed to the bank failures 
II. To identify the actions  of shareholders which contributed to the bank failures 
III. To categorize and evaluate the actions of managers and board members 
leading to the bank failures within the IFC corporate governance framework. 
 
1.5 Relevance of Topic 
It cost the Ghanaian government approximately GHS12.7 billion to clean the 
country’s financial sector (Ministry of Finance, 2019). This clean-up has momentarily 
impacted many activities in Ghana’s financial space adversely. Investor confidence in 
financial institutions has waned, causing a wave of panic withdrawals across the 
country. As a result, a growing number of these institutions are facing a liquidity 
crisis. It is therefore important to identify the factors that caused this crisis in order to 
prevent a reoccurrence.  
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The findings of the study will be relevant to both the BoG and Ghanaian bank 
managers and shareholders as it will expose some of their actions and how these led 
to the industry’s crisis. Additionally, policy makers will be more informed with this 
research, and can make policies that will prevent such an occurrence in the future. 
The findings of the study will also be relevant to depositors as they will be more 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter will see the discussion of both theoretical and empirical scholarly 
texts focusing on corporate governance, its definition and evolution over the years, 
banking crisis’ and their linkage to corporate governance. Corporate governance 
practices in Ghana will also be discussed. The various corporate governance models, 
namely the agency, resource dependency, stakeholder and shareholder theories will be 
summarized as well to better understand the global discourse and differing 
perspectives of corporate governance. Additionally, similar studies investigating the 
collapse of different countries’ industries and parallels in banking crisis’ will be 
reviewed. 
2.2 Theoretical Literature 
Existing literature regarding corporate governance theory will be reviewed in 
this chapter. 
2.2.1 Corporate Governance 
“The purpose of corporate governance is to help build an environment of trust, 
transparency and accountability necessary for fostering long-term investment, 
financial stability and business integrity, thereby supporting stronger growth and more 
inclusive societies” (OECD, 2015). In most enterprises, the separation of ownership 
and management brings about the potential for a conflict of interest. According to 
Shah (2014, p. 1), the “principal-agent problem arises when this relationship involves 
both misaligned incentives and information asymmetry”. In the banking industry for 
instance, the various principal-agent relationships between shareholders and 
management, as well as the “complex instruments provide a fertile breeding ground 
for conflicts” (Shah, 2014, p. 1). 
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The International Finance Corporation defines corporate governance as the 
“structures and processes by which companies are controlled”. Good corporate 
governance is said to enable organizations run more efficiently by “improving access 
to capital, mitigating risk and safeguarding against mismanagement. It makes 
companies more accountable and transparent to investors and gives them the tools to 
respond to stakeholder concerns” (IFC, 2020).  
The 2008 global financial crisis is an event in recent times that epitomizes the 
importance of efficient corporate governance practices. The crisis highlighted many 
of the principal-agent problems pertinent to the banking industry and emphasized the 
role of adequate corporate governance practices. In the build-up to the crisis, bank 
employees were faced with a conflict of interest between “the incentives created by 
their compensation contracts and their duty to the shareholders of their companies” 
(Shah, 2014, p. 22).  
Oghojafora, Olayemi, Okonji, and Okolie (2010) similarly established that an 
important characteristic of corporations is the division of ownership and management. 
In this regard, the owners or shareholders entrust decision making powers to 
managers. Accordingly, this separation results in shareholders losing their unlimited 
control over the decisions of managers. Corporate governance is therefore an 
endeavor to merge the interests of managers and shareholders by monitoring 
managers to ensure decision making powers are not exploited. (Oghojafora et al., 
2010).  
Johnson, Boone, Breach and Friedman (2000) defined corporate governance 
as the efficiency of structures that reduce the agency conflicts concerning managers 
while focusing keenly on defending the rights of minority shareholders. Brigham and 
Erhardt (2005) in their study, defined corporate governance as regulations employed 
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to ensure organizational success. The OECD on the one hand, describes corporate 
governance as the “set of relationships between a company’s management, its board 
its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance is also said to provide 
the structure through which objectives of the company are set and the means of 
attaining those objectives.” (OECD, 2015).  
The Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (1992) 
coined one of the most simple and popular definitions of corporate governance: “the 
system by which companies are directed and controlled” (para. 2.5). This definition 
incorporates all the systems and process employed by managers in achieving their 
objectives. The report goes on to define the roles of some influential stakeholders. 
“Shareholders are expected to appoint the directors and the auditors. Boards of 
directors are accountable for their company’s governance and must therefore engage 
in defining the company’s key objectives, monitor the performance of management 
and subsequently account to shareholders on their supervision”.  
In a more recent and lengthy description, Khan (2011, p.1) referred to 
corporate governance as “a broad term describing the process, customs, policies, laws 
and institutions that direct organizations in the way they act and control their 
operations”. Tirole (2001) established parallels between economists and legal scholars 
and arrived at her definition of corporate governance as simply being “the defense of 
shareholders’ interests” (p.1).  
Atuahene (2016, p.36) considers corporate governance to be about “effective, 
transparent and accountable governance, that holds individuals accountable, 
encourages stakeholder participation and facilitates the flow of information”. This 
view of corporate governance slightly differs from much earlier views that focused 
more on the process of controlling and direction of entities.  
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“Good corporate governance requires high standards of accounting and 
financial and non-financial disclosure” (UNCTAD, 2010, p.73). For banks, effective 
internal governance is extremely crucial as their stakeholders vary widely. By way of 
their primary function which leverages financial risk to generate revenue, weak 
corporate governance can expeditiously lead to avoidable vulnerability and a 
destructive image among depositors and the general public. 
2.2.2 Agency Theory 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), the agency relationship is 
identified as one where persons (the principal) appoint another (known as the agent), 
to act in the capacity of the principals or perform a set of activities on their behalf. 
This arrangement requires the principals to give some decision-making power to the 
agents. The authors further argue that if both parties in the agreement are “utility 
maximizers then there is good reason to believe that the agent will not always act in 
the best interests of the principal” (p. 308). This idea is the cornerstone of the agency 
theory which proposes that principals must adopt strategies that keep their agents in 
check, so agents are prevented from pursuing activities that do not fall in line with the 
interests of their principal.  
Unfortunately, the implementation of these strategies is said to come at a cost 
for both principals and agents. Agency costs comprise “the principal’s monitoring 
expenditure, bonding expenditures of the agent and residual losses” (p. 308). Over the 
years, considerable focus has been placed on earnings retention costs, time-horizon 
costs, moral hazard and risk aversion costs all of which have been classified as the 
most precarious agency costs (Mccolgan, 2001). Good corporate governance has the 
potential to mitigate agency costs according to Vargas-Hernández and Cruz (2018). 
The relationship between managers and stockholders of banks is a quintessential 
ACTIONS OF MANAGERS AND SHAREHOLDERS 15 
principal agency theory and thus this theory is relevant to this study on corporate 
governance. The agency theory is regarded as the earliest governance theory from 












2.2.3 Stewardship Theory 
The stewardship theory of corporate governance assumes that a steward 
(manager) will maximize shareholder value by attaining superior firm performance. 
This theory contrasts agency theory by viewing managers as individuals willing to 
offer their best to the organization. Donaldson and Davis (1991) noted that with the 
stewardship theory, “managers want to do a good job” (p. 51). And that variations in 
managerial performance are as a result of the manager’s “structural situation” (p.51), 
and whether or not this structure promotes better organizational performance.  
Smallman (2004) in relation to the stewardship theory also found that when 
“shareholder wealth is maximized, so too are stewards’ utilities” (p. 87). 
 Stewards understand that by attaining the firm’s targets, their personal needs 
will be met (Smallman 2004). Furthermore, it is suggested that stewards are given a 




• Monitoring expenses 
• Bonding expenses 




Figure 1 illustrating the agency theory 
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be encouraged as “control resources are better used in encouraging good stewards, 
rather than lowering their motivation through constraining their activities” (p.88).  
The stewardship theory essentially presumes that managerial activity is motivated by 
the desire to achieve and the inherent fulfillment derived from success (L’Huillier, 
2014). Under this theory, corporate governance focuses on creating organizational 
structures that inspire and encourage managers. 
2.2.4 Stakeholder Theory 
The stakeholder theory of corporate governance is a fusion of “business ethics, 
behavioral science, economic theory and the stakeholder concept” (Smallman, 2004, 
p.84). By incorporating the various stakeholders and interest groups organizations 
deal with, the theory is said to take into consideration the extra layer of complexity 
associated with the real world and unaccounted for in the agency theory (Smallman, 
2004). Per this theory, rather than focusing solely on the maximization of shareholder 
wealth, organizations have a duty to safeguard the interests of their diverse 
stakeholders, consisting of their employees, suppliers, customers, the government and 
many others. For example, as creditors supply loans to the organization, they expect 
to be paid back in full and on time. Local communities expect an improvement in 
their standard of living, employees expect to be compensated adequately for their 
commitment to the firm (Ntim, 2017).  
This theory suggests that the problem of governance stems from the lack of 
representation of the broader group of shareholders in controlling the organization. To 
manage this problem, organizations employ a dual board structure by utilizing a 
supervisory board and a management board. The supervisory board comprises a 
variety of stakeholders (Mallin, 2007). This model of governance is found in 
continental European countries such as Germany, France and Italy. 
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2.2.5 Resource Dependency Theory 
The main premise of the resource dependency theory is that firms need 
resources to operate, and the pursuit of these external resources influence the internal 
structures of firms. L’Huillier (2014) found that in the resource dependency theory, 
corporate governance is seen as a function of “the organization’s structure in relation 
to other such structures and the position of these in the wider society” (p. 309). Hung 
(1998, p.104) furthered this view by stating that “corporations depend upon one 
another for access to valuable resources and therefore seek to establish links in an 
attempt to regulate their interdependence”.  
Resources are unevenly distributed, and this increases the need for firms to 
depend on each other. Directors are tasked with managing external relationship to 
help link the firm to the resources it requires for its operations. This theory implies 
that the role of the board goes beyond controlling managers, but rather, the board in 
itself is a resource that can facilitate acquiring resources. Pfeffer (1972) argues that 
board size and composition are not random but are rather intentional and strategic 
reactions to a firm’s exterior influences. According to Pfeffer (1972, p.222), 
“organizations that have larger capital requirements will be more likely to have a 
greater percentage of their board of directors composed of representatives from 
financial institutions”, propagating the idea that a firm’s dependence on external 
resources, influences its internal structure. 
 
2.2.6 OECD Governance Principles 
The Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
initially published the first batch of corporate governance principles in 1999. These 
principles have since been revised and updated.  
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“The G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance allow policy makers to 
assess and enhance their legal, regulatory and institutional framework for corporate 
governance, while supporting efficiency, sustainable growth and financial stability.” 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2015, p. 3). These 
principles have become an international guide for corporations and institutional 
stakeholders around the world. The principles have also been endorsed and 
incorporated in the Financial Stability Board’s Key Standards for Sound Financial 
Systems and constitute the criteria for the World Bank’s Report on the Observance of 
Standards and Codes (ROSC) in corporate governance.  
The six principles are: “ensuring the basis for an effective corporate 
governance framework, the rights and equitable treatment of shareholders and key 
ownership functions, institutional investors, stock markets, and other intermediaries, 
the role of stakeholders in corporate governance, disclosure and transparency, the 
responsibilities of the board” (OECD, 2015).  
 
2.2.7 IFC Corporate Governance Framework 
IFCs corporate governance methodology serves as a framework that helps 
assess and strengthen the entire corporate governance system of a company. New 
updates to the framework have seen revisions to corporate governance considerations 
in light of the 2008 financial crisis. Six areas of governance have been included in the 
assessment of corporate governance: 
“Commitment to Environmental, Social, and Governance (Leadership and 
Culture): The company and its shareholders have demonstrated a commitment to 
implementing high-quality corporate governance, including the governance of key 
environmental and social policies and procedures. The structure and functioning of 
the board of directors: The board of directors is qualified and adequately structured to 
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oversee the strategy, management, and performance of the company. The control 
environment: The company’s internal control system, internal audit function, risk 
management system (including an environmental and social management system), 
and compliance function are sufficient to ensure sound stewardship of the company’s 
assets, effectiveness of operations, accuracy in reporting, and compliance with 
policies, procedures, laws, and regulations. Disclosure and Transparency: The 
company’s financial and nonfinancial disclosures are a relevant, faithful, and timely 
representation of material events to shareholders and other stakeholders. Treatment of 
minority shareholders: The company’s minority shareholders’ rights are not 
inadequate or abused, and other stakeholders are treated equitably. Governance of 
stakeholder engagement: The company’s governance of stakeholder engagement is 
inadequate, particularly oversight over stakeholder mapping, stakeholder engagement 
policy and grievance mechanisms.” (International Finance Corporation, 2018).  
The IFC Corporate Governance methodology utilizes a number of tools, 
matrices, checklists and other instruments to analyze and improve the corporate 
governance practices of companies. They are: 
The Instruction Sheet, Why Corporate Governance, Progression Matrix, Document 
and Information Request, IFC Indicative Independent Director Definition and Sample 
CG Improvement Programs.  
In assessing the corporate governance of banks and other financial institutions, 
the IFC recommends using the Advanced Financial Methodology for Financial 
Institutions. The Progression Matrix serves as the primary and most relevant tool in 
establishing the company’s “current governance framework and in identifying how 
well the company is performing in each of the six areas of governance” (IFC, 2020).   
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Figures 2 and 3 below illustrate the IFCs areas of corporate governance and 
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Figure 2 illustrating the progression matrix for the IFC areas of governance. Source: IFC, 2018 
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Figure 3 a continuation of the matrix from the previous page. Source: IFC, 2018
Running head: The Actions of Managers and Shareholders 
 
 
2.3 Empirical Literature  
2.3.1 Corporate Governance and Firm Performance 
With evidence from Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines and Malaysia; 
Praptiningsih (2009) conducted research to measure the relationship between the 
corporate performance of banks and their corporate governance monitoring 
mechanisms. The study incorporated data sets from 2003 to 2007 and analyzed 22 
banks in Indonesia, 12 in Thailand, 13 in the Philippines and 5 banks in Malaysia. 
The paper concluded by stating that good corporate governance monitoring 
mechanisms are important in achieving shareholder’s objectives. 
Bokpin (2013) found that governance in terms of a larger board size, highly 
improves the bank’s profit efficiency at the detriment of the bank’s cost efficiency. 
Bokpin also found that “the capital adequacy ratio and bank size are both significant 
predictors of bank efficiency in Ghana” (2013). In his study, Bokpin utilized 
accounting data and measures of efficiency between 1999 and 2007.  
Nsiah (2019) explored the role of corporate governance on the performance of 
local Ghanaian banks. The study examined 18 out of the 23 deposit taking banks at 
the time, representing 78% of all banks.  A panel analysis method was used. Bank 
performance was “quantified by the Return on Assets” (Nsiah, 2019), bank debt 
structure and the percentage of fixed assets to total assets. The level of corporate 
governance on the other hand, was measured with variables such as board size, board 
composition (executive to non-executive directors), division of CEO (differentiation 
between CEO and board chairman), gender diversity of board and the possession 
structure of the bank. The study found that the relationship between board size and 
bank performance is an inverted U-shaped one with a threshold value of 9. Meaning 
that, bank performance has a positive relationship with board size up until a board has 
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9 members, beyond that, it has a negative impact on performance. Additionally, per 
the study, an increase in the number of women on the board, insignificantly improved 
performance. 
Tornyeva and Wereko (2012) analyzed the Ghanaian insurance sector in their 
study. In order to identify the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance, secondary data was obtained from Ghana’s Insurance Commission 
whilst primary data was collected by way of interviews and questionnaires. The 
research revealed that a “large board size, board skill, management skill, longer 
serving CEOs, size of audit committee, audit committee independence, foreign 
ownership, institutional ownership, dividend policy and annual general meeting” 
(Tornyeva and Wereko, 2012) were all positive influences on the financial 
performance of insurance companies in Ghana.  
Considering the limited publications regarding corporate governance and 
financial companies in Ghana, this paper brought some clarity to the intricacies of the 
Ghanaian financial sector and the increased need for adequate corporate governance 
practices. Although the findings of their research may be somewhat applicable in this 
paper considering these are both financial institutions in Ghana, the Banking and 
Insurance sectors are undeniably different in both their operational models and the 
manner in which they are regulated. The 2018 banking crisis also presented new 
frontiers of financial information for Ghana. 
 
2.3.2 Corporate Governance Practices in Ghana 
Corporate governance practices of Ghanaian institutions have been 
characterized by a lack of transparency owing to the insufficient literature regarding 
the topic. Adegbite (2012) gives some insight by contributing to the body of 
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knowledge. In his study, Adegbite focused on board responsibility, board structure 
and composition, shareholder’s rights, transparency, disclosure and the audit 
committee. His study found that “Ghanaian listed banks do comply fully and partially 
with the 2002 SEC code of best practices” (Adegbite, 2012, p.73). Corruption was 
recognized as the key obstruction to proper governance practices. Adegbite also 
advised that regulatory bodies such as the SEC and the GSE be empowered to better 
regulate governance practices. His study largely focused on Ghana’s investment 
attractiveness to international investors and thus referred to corruption as a Ghanaian 
“socio-cultural problem”.  
Adegbite however, failed to list the specific and direct actions that constituted 
corruption in governance in the manner I seek to in this paper. Additionally, Ghana’s 
banking system has evolved since the time of his research owing to new regulatory 
legislation such as the Banks and Specialised Deposit-Taking Institutions Act, 2016. 
Amendments to the Industry Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and the adoption 
of the Basel II and Basel III frameworks have all reformed the country’s banking 
industry. 
Agyemang and Castellini (2015) reviewed corporate governance practices of 
emerging economies, by focusing on Ghana. It was observed that in Ghana, there was 
little to no separation between ownership and management of most institutions. 
Controlling shareholders were found to have a large degree of influence in managing 
the affairs of their institutions. This was ascribed to the weak enforcement of 
corporate governance rules by regulators. Shareholders as a result, are compelled to 
actively safeguard their investments. The report of Agyemang and Castellini (2015) is 
in accordance with the findings of Atuahene (2016) who noted that Ghanaian bank 
boards have “less independence due to dominance of government and family-
ACTIONS OF MANAGERS AND SHAREHOLDERS 26 
appointed directors who set the addendum of the board meeting to implement their 
own agenda” (p.41).  
Prior to Agyemang and Castellini (2015), Berglof and Claessens (2004, p.3) 
adopted a similar view which proposed that in developing economies with weak 
contracting instruments and environments, “the typical corporate governance response 
is high concentration” which may lead to limited risk diversification and poor 
performance. The World Bank ROSC (2010) reported that despite the Bank of 
Ghana’s efforts to improve corporate governance practices in Ghana, it “had not 
“released explicit governance regulations for banks and other financial institutions” 
(p.2).  
Ahorlu (2019) “examined the web-based disclosure practices among listed 
banks in Ghana (Ahorlu, 2019). A content analysis was employed to analyze the 
websites of the selected banks for the level of governance disclosures published. Per 
the study, banks listed in Ghana generally have low levels of governance disclosure as 
they do not “report information pertaining to organizational strategy, stakeholder 
engagement, governance process, ethical values and integrity” (Ahorlu, 2019). In 
contrast, an earlier World Bank ROSC (2010) report found that Ghana, “when 
compared with other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, does well with transparency 
and disclosure but lags in responsibilities of the board” (p.3).  
The World Bank ROSC (2010) report when analyzed against that of Ahorlu 
(2019), implies that Ghana’s governance disclosures may have worsened over time. 
The low level of governance reportage by Ghanaian banks is relevant to my research 
as disclosure and transparency practices happen to be one of the key areas in the IFC 
corporate governance methodology to be used in this study.   
 
ACTIONS OF MANAGERS AND SHAREHOLDERS 27 
2.3.3 Corporate Governance and Non-Performing Loans 
High NPLs have long been viewed as a determinant of banking crisis’ 
(Kroszner, 2002). This situation has been no different in Ghana with non-performing 
loans reaching record highs ahead of the banking crisis. 
Tekathon and Dechow (2013) established that efficient credit risk practices are 
important to the success and operations of financial institutions. As observed in 
Ghana’s 2018 banking crisis, the high percentage of non-performing loans resulted in 
the closure of a number of commercial banks operating in the country and 
consequently affected the country’s financial sector.  
According to Amuakwa-Mensah and Boakye-Adjei (p.39, 2015), Sub-Saharan 
Africa’s debt aggregation has been linked to “terms of trade deterioration and 
interbank loans which are present in the context of low equity and absence of 
diversification”. The absence of diversification theory is consistent with earlier 
studies such as that of Berglof and Claessens (2004).  
The relationship between governance practices and bad asset quality is one 
that has been of interest for years. Berger and DeYoung (1997) in a bid to link ‘bad 
management’ to non-performing loans, employed granger-casualty techniques in 
testing their hypotheses. Their results confirmed that “bad management practices are 
manifested not only in excess expenditures, but also in subpar underwriting and 
monitoring practices that eventually lead to non-performing loans” (Berger and 
DeYoung, 1997, p.13).  
In a more recent study, Karim, Chan and Hassan (2010) who investigated the 
association between NPLs and bank efficiency, again observed that “banks’ 
inefficiencies may lead to higher non-performing loans” (Karim, Chan and Hassan, 
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p.123, 2010). Additionally, Bokpin (2015) established that the corporate governance 
and structure of banks are strong determinants of their attitudes to credit risk.  
With the high percentage of NPLs being reported as one of the major causes of 
Ghana’s bank failures, these studies reveal the link between poor corporate 
governance and non-performing loans. Considering the large stock of NPLs and the 
role these played in Ghana’s banking crisis, evaluating the relationship between bank 
asset quality and corporate governance was necessary. 
The role of corporate governance was further assessed by Eric Tetteh (2019) 
as he analyzed the impact of corporate governance on asset quality in the Ghanaian 
banking sector. The study investigated 32 banks that operated in Ghana from 2006 to 
2016. Findings from the study revealed that non-executive board member ratio has a 
“significant inverse relationship on NPLs”.  Also, it was established that board gender 
has “a significant and a direct relationship with NPLs” (Tetteh, 2019). 
In their paper ‘Corporate governance in Ghana: An analysis of board accountability in 
Ghanaian listed banks’, Amartey, Yu and Chukwu-Iobelu (2019) asserted that 
Ghanaian banks were ineffectively using their board accountability mechanisms 
which composed of internal and external audits and audit committees. They suggested 
frequently changing independent auditors and submitting to a mandatory national 
corporate governance charter as ways to improve governance practices. The study 
added to African governance literature by disclosing insight from board. 
 
2.3.4 Corporate Governance and Banking Failures 
           Benson (2019) investigated the factors that led to the collapse of Unibank 
Ghana. The study collected qualitative data in the form of interviews from the bank’s 
former staff, as well as quantitative data from the bank’s annual reports. Benson’s 
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target population consisted of all former Accra based staff of the bank. The study 
randomly selected 5 former staff occupying the following positions: branch manager, 
credit officer, operations manager, SME relationship manager, and a corporate SME 
manager. The research attributed UniBank’s collapse to factors such as high interest 
rates leading to high non-performing loans. “ambitious expansion, business promotion 
for fixed deposit mobilization, and above all, misreporting of the financial state of the 
bank” (Nsiah, 2019). The bank’s related political party transactions were also listed as 
a reason for its collapse. Nsiah’s research focused only on Unibank and identified the 
factors leading to its collapse. This paper will however focus on all the collapsed 
banks in an attempt to identify the direct actions of managers and shareholders.  
According to the 2010 United Nation Conference on Trade and Development, 
“substandard corporate governance practices” resulting from “the risk management 
standards prevailing in many large institutions” were among the leading causes of the 
global financial crisis in 2008. Insight from the conference further identified certain 
aspects of corporate governance that could be improved upon in financial institutions 
around the world. These included; “strengthening board oversight, positioning risk 
management as a key board responsibility and encouraging renumeration practices 
that balance risk and long-term performance criteria.” (UNCTAD, 2010).  “The link 
between corporate governance and a broader range of stakeholders has never been 
clearer.” 
 
2.3.5 Ghanaian Banking Codes 
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Corporate Governance Directive 
The 2018 banking crisis provoked the bank of Ghana to publish a corporate 
governance directive which outlined actions that directors and managers of banks 
must engage in to promote good corporate governance in their organisations. Per the 
directive, banks are required to separate the roles of the board chairman and the chief 
executive officer, with the act preventing any person from occupying both roles 
concurrently (Corporate Governance Directive, 2018, p. 13). Related persons are also 
prohibited from assuming these positions in the same financial institution (p.13).  
Prior to this directive, The World Bank’s (2010) ROSC report found that corporate 
governance standards for Ghanaian banks were “largely unwritten” (p.10). Despite 
the relevance of the directive to Banking in Ghana, using it as a framework for this 
study will be counteractive as it was produced as a result of these same errs. 
2016 Banks and Specialized Deposit-Taking Act 930 
This act serves as one of the core legislations that guide the operations of 
banks in the Ghanaian banking industry. The act gives the central bank the veto power 
on proposed director appointments, the issuances and revocations of banking licenses 
as well as the power to administer penalties in the event of a breach in regulations. 
The bank is also responsible for setting the minimum capital requirement, which it 
revised in 2017. 
 
2.3.6 The Changing Face of Corporate Governance Practices 
Weak and inept corporate governance practices have been blamed for the 2008 
financial crisis. Fernández Sánchez, Odriozolla Zamanillio and Luna (2020) 
empirically investigated how the crisis has redefined corporate governance practices 
by focusing mainly on the shareholder and stakeholder models of governance. 
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Between 2002 and 2015, the study sampled 46 commercial banks with the largest 
asset bases in the world and employed a corporate governance score, assessing their 
corporate systems and processes. The findings revealed that post 2008, banks 
implementing the stakeholder model of governance, on average, increased their 
number of annual board meetings from 9.3 to 12.4 while the average of 12.1 remained 
unchanged for their shareholder-focused counterparts.  
For both categories of governance, the percentage of banks requiring a 
majority vote for the election of a director increased (87% increase for shareholder 
governance and 55% for stakeholder governance) after 2008.  Improvements were 
again seen in measures of executive compensation and takeovers signifying an overall 
improvement in governance effectiveness.  
Contemporary studies of corporate governance have emphasized the convergence of 
the shareholder and stakeholder models. Convergence in corporate governance 
parlance refers to “the increasing isomorphism of governance practices” (Yoshikawa 
and Rasheed, 2009, p.389). As seen in Figure 4, there appears to have been some 
confluence between the two models over the period up until 2012 where the 
divergence is attributed to the European sovereign debt crisis.  
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Figure 4. The progression of the CG Score by the corporate governance model, 2002-2015. (Fernández Sánchez et 
al., 2020) 
Fernández Sánchez et al. (2020) attributed the increased convergence mainly 
to Continental European banks who notably enhanced their corporate governance 
mechanisms to improve the entire banking system. The findings above exhibit the 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Overview of the Method Selection  
As the study seeks to explore the role of corporate governance and bank 
regulation in Ghana’s 2018 crisis, this chapter will focus on the methodology 
employed. A content analysis was used as data was gathered from various sources 
including newspapers, blogposts, written articles and interviews. The data collected 
was largely qualitative and secondary in nature. The rationale for the methodology 
selected will be discussed later in this chapter.  
 
3.2 Content Analysis Design  
Content analyses are regarded as one of the earliest approaches to analyzing 
text (Onsomu, 2015). According to Seale (2004), a content analysis refers to any 
technique of analyzing texts based on the frequency of certain ideas, terms or 
concepts. “Initially content analysis dealt with ‘the objective, systematic and 
quantitative description of the manifest content of communication’ (Berelson, 1952, 
p. 18) however, it has gradually evolved to comprise analyses of concealed ideas and 
concepts in texts (Graneheim and Lundman, 2004). 
Content analyses are used to discover patterns and recurrent themes in texts 
which may be written, oral or visual. Researchers further use this method to find out 
about the intent, themes and impacts of texts (Luo, 2013). 
The data, despite being qualitative can be analyzed quantitatively through the use of 
graphs and charts. 
The first step in conducting a content analysis is to select the content to 
analyze based on the research question. Since my research question centers on the 
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role of corporate governance in Ghana’s banking crisis, I identified texts such as 
interviews, blogposts, and newspaper publications that discussed the issue.  
Content Analysis Process 
When conducting a content analysis, a myriad of ideas, concepts and 
meanings are relevant to the undertaking. Despite contrasting views on what a unit of 
analysis is, for the purposes of this paper, it is defined as either a subject or whole text 
forming the center of analysis of the study (Graneheim and Lundman, 2004). A 
meaning unit can be defined as any particular theme expressed or relayed by a group 
of words or phrases in the context of the study (Graneheim and Lundman, 2004). In 
order to preserve the reliability of data, meaning units should not be too lengthy as 
this makes analysis difficult, owing to the varied meanings presented.  
Data is further reduced in size (condensed) and analyzed to extract themes that 
are useful in connecting the various categories identified, whilst the condensed 
meaning units are tagged with codes (Graneheim and Lundman, 2004). In a content 
analysis, the credibility of the study is concerned with how precisely the generated 
themes and categories exhaust the ideas in the texts.  
3.3 Research Scope 
         The research scope sets the parameters within which the research is conduced. 
3.3.1 Data Sources 
         Newspapers, which form a major part of this study, are widely regarded as a 
major source of information dissemination. In order to ensure that the data retrieved is 
of an acceptable level of validity and authority, only major news websites were 
included. This includes the following sources; Graphic Online, MyJoyOnline, The 
Businss and Financial Times. Internationally recognized sources such as Bloomberg 
and Reuters were also scanned for texts relevant to the study. Reports from 
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PricewaterhouseCoopers and the Bank of Ghana are also included as these are reliable 
sources of financial information in Ghana. 
 
3.4 Sampling Strategy  
            A total of 186 newspapers between 2017 and 2019 (representing the study’s 
sampling frame) were scanned for texts related to Ghana’s banking crisis. Out of this 
number, 63 were publications of the BFT representing approximately 34% while the 
remaining 66% (123 publications) were texts from The Daily Graphic. A breakdown 
of the newspapers is presented in Table 1 below. A purposive sampling method was 
used in identifying texts within the sampling frame that had content on Ghana’s 
banking crisis.  
             A purposive sampling strategy was used because this technique allows 
researchers to focus on materials most relevant to the study and consequently acquire 
a more accurate depiction of the issue at hand (Patton, 2014). A random sample 
would not have captured fully the information I sought. Sampling methods are 
designed to increase the accuracy and integrity of the study (Morse, 2016) and for this 
research, a purposive sampling strategy was the deemed to be ideal. 
Table 1 showing the breakdown of newspapers used 
  Newspaper Breakdown (number of papers) 
Period BFT Daily Graphic 
2016 - 2018 24 68 
2019 39 55 
Sum 63 123 
Grand Total 186 
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3.5 Research Design  
             A total number of 58 newspapers were found to have texts discussing the 
2018 banking crisis. These, as previously stated, were publications by The Daily 
Graphic and The Business and Financial Times between 1st January 2017 and 31st 
December 2018.  The 58 papers represent approximately 31% of the entire sampling 
frame. 
              The general public’s perception of the 2018 Banking Crisis is bound to be 
shaped by the media’s choice of portrayal.  
I decided to choose the newspaper with the highest readership and another focusing 
solely on issues pertaining to finance. According to GeoPoll’s 2017 survey, the Daily 
Graphic is the most read daily newspaper in Ghana, with 1.5 million readers a day 
(GeoPoll, 2018). The Business and Financial Times although not as popular (148,000 
readers), is regarded as the country’s authoritative source of Financial news. The 
paper is said to be “Ghana’s biggest business newspaper with a varied readership base 
across the 16 administrative regions of the country” (Business & Financial Times, 
2020) and hence the reason for its inclusion in my research.   
The texts were analyzed for insights regarding the roles of shareholders and managers 
in Ghana’s banking crisis. The units of meaning were then extracted and recorded. 
These units then informed categories and themes for the study. 
 
3.5.1 Categories and Themes 
A total of nine categories and two themes were derived from the data. The 
categories and themes derived are presented in Table 2 below. The categories were 
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recorded based on how suitable they were to the study. The point of saturation was 
attained when new categories could no longer be derived from the data. 
 
Table 2 showing the categories and themes identified in the data 
Categories Themes 
Improper shareholder lending 
  
Poor credit assessment 
Non-compliance with banking credit 
regulation 
Excessive shareholder control Corporate governance actions 
Misreporting finances 
  
Fraudulent license acquisition 
Fund misappropriation 
Improper board practices 
Central bank laxity Poor BoG regulation 
 
3.6 Ethical Considerations 
The ethical considerations are an important part of any research work. Human 
beings and their property are to be engaged, it is important that the right procedures 
are followed and respected. Since the articles of individuals was utilized, the 
information presented was represented as accurately as possible with extra attention 
being paid so as to not misconstrue any statements made. Additionally, as data was 
retrieved from a variety of sources, the copyright policies regarding the pieces of 
information were respected and any procedures were duly followed. This was done to 
avoid any lawsuits or copyright infringements. 
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3.7 Limitations 
Content Analysis’ often tend to be reductive in nature. The entire meaning of 
texts may be reduced to aspects that may be of interest to the research. For this study 
particularly, the use of a content analysis to categorize the major themes into actions 
of the regulator and corporate governance failures led to insights not falling into either 
category being sidelined. Furthermore, Content Analysis’ are extremely time 
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CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS AND INTEPRETATION 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyzes and discusses the data gathered. The data gathered was 
used in providing answers to the research questions and the objectives set out in 
preceding chapters. Answers were provided by expanding on the themes and 
categories that emerged from the data as well as by using the IFC’s corporate 
governance framework as a model for analysing the practices of owners and managers 
in the failed institutions.  
The research questions:  
1. How was Ghana’s 2018 banking crisis a consequence of corporate governance 
malpractices and what direct actions by managers and shareholders can be 
linked to the collapse of their institutions? 
2. Under which areas of the IFC’s corporate governance framework can the 
actions and inactions of managers and owners, leading to the collapse of their 
banks, be categorized and evaluated? 
The objectives of the research were to:  
i. To identify the actions of managers which contributed to the bank failures 
ii. To identify the actions  of shareholders which contributed to the bank failures 
iii. To categorize and evaluate the actions of managers and board members 
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4.1.1 Typical Management Structure 
A diagram representing the typical management structure is presented in 
figure 5 below. The diagram aims to help clarify the relationships between the various 
stakeholder groups in an organization.   
 
Figure 5 showing the typical organizational structure 
As presented in figure 5 above, the shareholders are responsible for electing 
the board of directors. The board of directors have a duty at all times to protect the 
interests of the company. They appoint a CEO who, along with other senior 
managers, run the organization in line with objectives set out.   
 
4.2 Summary Findings from Content Analysis 
Figure 6 below summarises the findings from the content analysis. Categories 
and themes were deduced from the data based on the similarity of ideas presented in 
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Figure 6 Showing the categories and themes derived from the data 
 
4.3 Research Question 1: How was Ghana’s 2018 banking crisis a consequence of 
corporate governance malpractices and what direct actions by managers and 
shareholders can be linked to the collapse of their institutions? 
The direct actions of managers and shareholders were revealed by the content 
analysis. This question is therefore answered by expanding on the categories and 
Meaning Unit Category Themes
"BOG approval of non-existent investment to be" converted into a credit 
"facility" 
"Politically motivated regulatory environment" "Central bank laxity in supervisory role"
BOG inadequate guidance on certain "key criteria"
BOG failure to appoint bank advisors after granting liquidity support
Late publication on guidance regarding M&As by BOG
Unpaid loans handed to shareholders and directors by themselves and 
remaining unpaid Improper shareholder lending
"Inter related lending"
Approval of loans without necessary  process
Approval of loans earning no interest income or not backed by collateral
Lending to very risky borrowers
"High lending appetite by banks"
Breach of Single Obligor Limit
"Major shareholder flouted banking and risk management rules" by using 
depositors funds as personal funds
Non-compliance with banking credit 
principles
Shareholders excessive control of managers Excessive shareholder control
Exaggeration of investments in other entities
Exaggeration of capital by leveraging fixed assets
"Overstatement of loans and advances to customers" Misreporting of finances
"Under provision of loans"
Fabricated investment in its accounting records
Use of Political connections to secure banking license
"Re-engineering capital through suspicious placements to local financial 
institutions Fraudulent/Improper license acquisition
Use of non-existing investment certificate" to procure banking license 
Use of BOG liquidity support to set up another bank"
"Approval of bank funds to be used as fixed deposit payments in other 
company" owned by a shareholder Funds misappropriation
"Use of BOG liquidity support to settle "maturing obligations and crystalised 
international credit lines"
Infrequent board meetings 
Non-executive directors disregarding their duty to scrutinize their executive 
counterparts
Approval of large executive compensation packages inconsistent with bank's 
performance Improper board practices
Shareholders Combining operations of banks' with their companies
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themes derived. The extent to which these actions contributed to the crisis are 
however discussed in their application toward the IFC principles. 
 
4.3.1 Expansion and Discussion of Categories 
Central Bank Laxity in supervisory role 
A number of meaning units identified described the Bank of Ghana as being 
nonchalant in the performance of its duties. It was noted that the central bank, in the 
case of a certain/ Capital bank, approved non-existent investments to be converted 
into credit facilities. The laxity of the central bank was particularly highlighted 
considering a report addressing the non-existent investments was published two years 
before the regulator’s approval to convert the investments into a credit facility. A 
politically motivated regulatory environment was another factor pointed out. A 
recurring idea in the texts scanned was the fact that the actions of the central bank 
were strongly influenced by Ghana’s political landscape. Thereby undermining the 
autonomy of the BoG in the performance of its duties.  
With the mandate of the BoG being to promote a sound banking system, the 
regulators seem to have failed in their duties. 
Improper Shareholder Lending 
Insider lending, defined as lending to shareholders and managers, was found 
to be one of the main reasons for the abnormally high non-performing loans in the 
failed institutions. A considerable amount of these loans remained unpaid. In some of 
the collapsed banks it was reported that non-interest-bearing loans were given to 
shareholders and these loans were not backed by any collateral. Managers and 
shareholders failed to payback these loans and consequently ballooned their firms 
non-performing loans and created a liquidity crisis.  
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Poor credit assessment practices  
Credit assessment can be defined as the due processes entities and individuals 
must undergo in order to establish their creditworthiness. In the defunct banks, credit 
assessment practices were lacking. The collapsed banks in a bid to increase their 
interest income, developed high lending appetites to take advantage of the market’s 
relatively high interest rate. The high lending appetites meant these banks had to 
loosen their already inadequate credit practices and lend to high risk borrowers in 
risky sectors of the economy. 
It was also found that depositors’ unfavorable perception of the local banks 
meant the local banks had to offer higher deposit rates than their foreign counterparts. 
This increment in the deposit rate translated to an increase in the risk of default for 
local banks. By adopting a high lending appetite, the banks forewent undertaking the 
required credit assessment practices. 
Non-compliance with banking credit principles 
Aside from having poor credit assessment practices, the banks also failed to 
comply with banking regulations such as the single obligor limit. The single obligor 
limit is the maximum amount a bank may lend to any given individual or institution. 
From the research conducted, this limit was exceeded in favor of certain shareholders 
and clients. It was also established that major shareholders defied banking and risk 
management rules by using the funds of depositors as their personal reserves. In some 
cases, shareholders’ funds were used to launch and personally invest in other 
businesses.  
Excessive shareholder control 
Major shareholders reportedly had excessive control in the daily operations of 
the banks. The excessive control by shareholders can be linked to lending to high risk 
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borrowers and improper shareholder lending. Major shareholders determined the 
lending practices by controlling managers. This allowed them to lend to themselves 
while employing improper lending practices. This excessive control also translated to 
banks non-compliance with credit regulations and the use of the banks’ funds as the 
personal reserves of owners. In one of the failed banks, the undue influence of 
shareholders led to the bank paying for brand name royalties at a time when it was 
struggling financially. It was later revealed that this decision was taken without the 
knowledge of other minority shareholders on the board.  
Misreporting of Finances 
Misreporting financials was another activity the managers of the collapsed 
banks engaged in. The banks fabricated investments in their accounts, overstated their 
investments in other entities, their loans and advances to customers and inflated their 
value of the shareholder’s capital by leveraging their fixed assets. In one of the banks, 
it was observed that the chief executive officer failed to disclose to the board of 
directors, a loan payment the company had received from its debtor.  
All of these unethical practices created an inaccurate picture of the company’s 
financial standing. Making it hard for the regulator to take the appropriate actions. In 
order to prevent some of these actions, banks are required to have independent 
auditors. The neutrality of auditors was reportedly compromised in these institutions.  
Fraudulent/Improper License acquisition 
In acquiring their banking licenses, some banks utilized their political 
connections. This ties in with the politically motivated regulatory environment 
identified. Other banks secured their banking licenses either by using certificates of 
non-existent investments or by restructuring suspicious capital placements to local 
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financial institutions. As a result of these actions, non-qualifying institutions were 
given the clearance to operate, compromising the country’s banking sector.   
Funds Misappropriation 
The mismanagement of company funds was another action by managers and 
shareholders that led to the collapse of their financial institutions. As stated earlier, 
shareholders’ funds were used in setting up other businesses. Liquidity support given 
by the BoG to help the struggling banks, was in one case, used to set up another bank 
and transferred to shareholders’ related companies. A portion of the liquidity support 
was also used to pay for business promotion managed by a board member. In other 
banks, the liquidity support was used to service maturing debt obligations and credit 
lines. Funds were also used as fixed deposit payments in a company owned by a 
shareholder. 
Improper Board Practices 
The payment of brand name royalties without the knowledge of some board 
members exemplifies the improper board practices adopted by the boards of the banks 
in question. In addition to shareholders combining the operations of their companies 
with that of the banks, some of the boards were found to have approved enormous 
compensation packages which were inconsistent with their bank’s performance. Non-
executive directors were also blamed for failing to scrutinize the actions of their 
executive counterparts.  
Finally, it was found that the infrequency of board meetings presented another 
board practice that negatively impacted the banks. 
A list of the direct actions of managers and shareholders is presented in the table 
below, as extracted from the meaning units of the content analysis. 
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Table 3 showing the direct actions of managers and shareholders 
Actions of Shareholders and Managers 
Inter related lending 
Loan approval without necessary process 
Granting of loans earning no interest 
Lending to risky borrowers 
Breaching single obligor limit 
Use of depositors funds as personal funds 
Shareholder excessive control of managers 
Exaggeration of investments 
Overstatement of loans and advances to customers 
Fabricating investments 
Re-engineering capital 
Use of BoG liquidity support to setup bank 
Use of bank funds to pay off obligations in related companies 
Infrequent board meetings 
Non-executive directors disregarding duties 
Approval of large compensation packages 
 
4.4 Research Question 2: Under which areas of the IFC’s corporate governance 
framework can the actions and inactions of managers and shareholders, leading 
to the collapse of their banks, be categorized and evaluated? 
           The actions of managers and shareholders outlined above were analyzed using 
the IFCs corporate governance framework. Where applicable, empirical and 
theoretical studies were used to buttress or contradict the findings. The relevant areas 
were subsequently listed.  
 
4.4.1 Applying the IFC Framework 
Structure and functioning of board 
           Level 1 CG practices in this area demand that the board of directors meet 
regularly to discuss important issues and devise strategies for growth. As exposed in 
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the analysis, board meetings were held sporadically in these banks. The boards were 
therefore unable to deliberate on issues and strategize on the best course of action. In 
a sense, this gave directors the leeway to engage in corrupt practices. Level 2 calls for 
the board to be composed of qualified and skilled persons. One of the defunct banks 
had a board chairman who was solely a religious leader with no previous banking 
experience. The lack of skill and banking expertise by the board chair can be 
associated with the bank’s collapse as it could be argued that he did not understand 
fully the implications of certain decisions. 
           Board duties and responsibilities were not clearly defined in the banks. From 
the excessive shareholder control in daily operations to the use of depositor’s funds as 
a personal reserve, it is clear that the power of the owners was unrestricted. Non-
executive directors were noted to have abandoned their duty of scrutinizing their 
executive counterparts owing to the fringe benefits they were made to enjoy. This 
means there were truly no independent directors on the board, weakening the structure 
and functioning of the boards. There was a failure to uphold any standard corporate 
governance practices in this area and this prevented the boards from functioning in 
their full capacity.  
            The banks failed to implement common practices in this area. 
In respect to the competence of the board, Westlake (2013) found that bank directors 
are expected to comprehend fully the intricacies of the financial industry. This allows 
them to ask relevant questions and monitor the right metrics. The competence of a 
religious leader with no banking expertise chairing a bank’s board can easily be 
linked to the bank’s failure as evidence from the 2008 global financial crisis revealed 
that banks with board chairs having a finance background performed better. 
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Atuahene (2016) propounded that Ghanaian boards are not autonomous but are rather 
controlled by family-elected directors who pursue their self-serving schemes.  
             This statement when analysed alongside the actions of the board, holds 
somewhat true. Although the content analysis did not reveal any family relation on 
the boards, the pursuit of self-serving schemes was very much evident. Board 
members transferred parts of the granted liquidity support to their related companies. 
Others used the liquidity support to pay off maturing debt obligations in their related 
companies while others simply used depositors’ funds to invest in other companies. 
The recurrent theme is a transfer of funds to related companies. Exhibiting the self-
serving schemes mentioned by Atuahene (2016). 
           Additionally, the importance of non-executive directors on boards was 
reiterated by Tetteh (2019) who established a significant inverse relationship between 
the number of non-executive directors on boards and the non-performing loans of 
banks. In the defunct banks however, non-executive directors neglected their 
fiduciary duties and thus, failed to improve board functioning. The functionality of 
the board was greatly influenced by overbearing shareholders. 
Control Environment and process 
             This area is generally concerned with internal control processes meant to keep 
operations sound. The employment of risk management structures and independent 
auditors are among some of the ways the best corporate governance practices can be 
achieved in this area. The single obligor limit is one such risk management structure. 
UT Bank breached its single obligor limit of GHS 20 million through its exposure 
valued at GHS 302 million to Mr. Ibrahim Mahama and his related enterprises. The 
bank also granted a number of under-collateralized loans including one with collateral 
worth GHS 990,000 for a loan of GHS 30.8 million. Unibank similarly granted GHS 
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5.3 billion to related enterprises and shareholders with GHS 1.6 billion not being 
secured by any collateral.  
           Beige Bank contravened the cash reserve requirement of 10% with its cash 
reserves of 1.97%. The bank also recorded a capital adequacy ratio of -17.2% 
contrary to the regulatory benchmark of 10% and non-performing loans of 72.8%. 
Royal Bank recorded a capital adequacy ratio of -80.53% and non-performing loans 
made up 78.8% of its entire loans. Loans to shareholders and related parties were 
valued at GHS 162 million. 
          Poor credit assessment practices such as the granting of loans with insufficient 
collateral as well as lending to risky borrowers characterized the control environment 
and process of these banks. The banks found ways to manoeuvre the single obligor 
limit, a structure meant to minimise their risk exposure. They engaged in practices 
that unavoidably led to the accumulation of a high value of non-performing loans.  
            Per the IFC framework, the board of directors are expected to consistently 
review their institutions adherence to risk management standards and processes. In the 
case of these banks however, directors and shareholders connived to negatively 
influence the lending procedures and risk practices as they exerted their power to 
grant loans to related parties with little to no collateral. The companies’ risk 
management structures, if existent, could be described as ineffective as they were 
neglected by shareholders looking to lend to related parties.  
             As stated, the banks’ shareholders unduly influencing the credit and risk 
procedures is indicative of the high ownership concentration in the banks. High 
ownership concentration, defined as a high degree of control exerted by owners, in a 
bid to protect their interests, is a phenomenon that has long been associated with 
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developing countries. Similarly, Agyemang and Castellini (2015) found no separation 
of ownership and management in Ghanaian companies.  
            Controlling shareholders largely influence operations. This is blamed on 
regulators weak corporate governance enforcement. Shareholders are thereby forced 
to actively safeguard their investments. This is consistent with the empirical study by 
Berglof and Claessens (2004) detailed in the literature review above. Their study also 
noted that countries with inefficient contracting systems have corporate governance 
systems typified by extreme ownership concentration that translates to limited risk 
diversification and poor performance.  
            True to this, it was observed that the failed banks, whose shareholders were 
actively involved in their operations, failed to adequately diversify their risk. Their 
failure to diversify risk was seen in their overexposure to certain clients and their 
significant related party transactions. This ultimately led to their abnormally high 
non-performing loans stated above. Applying the agency theory, the shareholders of 
the banks understood that their agents (managers) were unlikely to act in their best 
interest at all times. In order to curb this, the shareholders of the banks should have 
employed proper strategies to keep managers in check, rather than attempting to direct 
operations themselves. 
Disclosure and Transparency 
UT Bank failed to adhere to basic level 1 CG practices with regards to the area 
of disclosure and transparency. Level 1 requires that companies comply with the 
highest accounting disclosure principles in their countries. Ghanaian institutions have 
since 2007, been expected to adhere to International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS). These standards require organisations to disclose all cash receipts from clients 
which UT Bank failed to do.  
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            Furthermore, both Capital Bank and UT Bank failed to disclose their financial 
statements in the 2 years leading to their collapse. This was in breach of sections 78 
and 90 of the 2016 Banks and Specialised Deposit-Taking Institutions Act 960 which 
require banks to annually produce financial statements informed by transactions of the 
most recently ended year, and to publish these statements. The entire category of 
‘misreporting finances’ can be placed under this area of the framework. By 
misreporting their finances, the companies failed to comply with national reporting 
standards adopted. The integrity of auditors is also brought into question as 
independent auditors were expected to review the companies’ financials. Section 85 
of Act 960 requires auditors to submit to the Bank of Ghana at least once a year, an 
audit report “giving a true and fair view of the state of affairs of the bank and its 
results”.  
           The empirical findings on disclosure and transparency generally correspond 
with the findings above. Ahorlu (2019) established that Ghanaian banks have a low 
level of disclosure. This ties in with the companies misreporting their finances or not 
publishing their financials altogether. Normally, managers misreporting finances 
would have been explained by the agency theory and under the guise of managers 
seeking to increase their personal wealth illegally and at the expense of shareholders.  
In this case however, misreporting finances was done by managers as a result of 
fraudulent transactions commissioned by shareholders.  
Treatment of minority shareholders 
           Capital bank failed to observe the rights of minority shareholders. Intermediate 
(level 2) practices require that minority shareholders are properly represented and that 
their views be considered in board settings. This level further requires the firm to have 
agreed upon principles concerning the complete and prompt disclosure of information 
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to all shareholders, and that these principles be complied with. The bank, by coming 
to a decision without the consent of its minority shareholders, disregarded these 
principles. This caused a significant international minority shareholder to terminate its 
relationship with the bank. This termination subsequently led to international creditors 
calling back their loans and credit facilities, inducing liquidity problems for the bank. 
Across all the affected banks, it was found that high compensation packages were 
being administered. This, in the IFC framework, is associated with the treatment of 
minority shareholders.  
          In organisations applying advanced corporate governance practices, executive 
compensation packages are subject to the consent of shareholders. In the case of these 
banks, the payment of compensation packages inconsistent with the performance of 
the bank may be suggestive of the fact that the interests of directors overrode all 
others. Minority shareholders expect that the firm’s best interest is looked after. This 
was not the case as compensation packages were being paid despite the banks 
struggling financially. Non-executive directors who have a fiduciary duty to supervise 
and preserve the best interest of the entity, either neglected their duties or were 
disregarded.  
         The actions of managers and shareholders can therefore be classified under 4 
areas of the IFC’s framework. Namely: the structure and functioning of the board, the 
control environment and process, disclosure transparency and the treatment of 
minority shareholders. These are the 4 areas of the IFC corporate governance 
framework in which managers and shareholders of the defunct banks fell short.  
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4.3 Conclusion 
          The findings and discussions above have highlighted how the managers and 
shareholders of the banks were largely to blame for their collapse. Direct actions 
leading to the collapse included: lending to risky borrowers, approving loans earning 
no interest income or backed by insufficient collateral, breaching the single obligor 
limit and as a result, overexposing their banks to clients, who often turned out to be 
risky borrowers. This ties in with poor the poor credit practices employed as a result 
of the excessive shareholder control in the daily operations of the banks. Lending to 
parties associated with directors and shareholders were also noted to be an action 
leading to the collapse as these loans often remained unpaid. The wrongful use of 
funds and subsequently misreporting finances were other actions linked to the 
collapse of the banks.  
 
        In using the IFC framework to evaluate the malpractices of directors and 
shareholders, the four areas within which the malpractices applied were: the structure 
and functioning of the board, the control environment and process, disclosure 
transparency and the treatment of minority shareholders. In evaluating the structure 
and functioning of the board, the analysis revealed that by not having frequent 
meetings, the directors gave room for unethical practices to remain unchecked. The 
functioning of the board was further hindered by directors who pursued their selfish 
interests by transferring liquidity support to their related companies. The control 
environment was characterised by directors and shareholders disregarding risk 
management mechanisms and lending practices.  
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          The banks breached their single obligor limits and independent auditors failed 
to perform their duties. With regards to the disclosure and transparency of the banks, 
the banks defied banking regulations by failing to publish their financials. The failure 
to publish financials was attributed to managers attempting to cover up the damage 
caused by the poor lending practices employed. The banks further failed to observe 
basic practices in the area of minority shareholder treatment. By taking decisions 
without the consent of minority shareholders and by paying large compensation 
packages inconsistent with performance, it was established that minority shareholders 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
5.1 Introduction 
        This chapter provides a brief summary of the results, findings and analysis that 
inform the conclusions drawn. Recommendations for future studies and the 
limitations of the study are also discussed in this chapter. 
 
5.2 Summary 
        This thesis sought to investigate how Ghana’s 2018 banking crisis was a 
consequence of corporate governance malpractices and the direct actions undertaken 
by managers and shareholders of the Ghanaian banks declared insolvent between 
2017 and 2018 namely: UT Bank, Capital Bank, Unibank, Royal Bank, Beige Bank, 
Sovereign Bank and Construction Bank. Furthermore, these actions were categorized 
and evaluated using the IFCs corporate governance framework. 
          Previous studies focusing on corporate governance in Ghana had failed to 
disclose managerial practices. The studies often quantitatively measured the 
performance of banks against certain governance monitoring mechanisms and thus 
the need for an analysis on the actions of managers and shareholders.  
The literature review provided extensive information regarding theoretical and 
empirical corporate governance studies as well as the changing nature of corporate 
governance worldwide. The chapter also reinforced the importance of corporate 
governance in the profitability and risk management of banks, and its corresponding 
importance in the soundness of a country’s financial system.  
          186 newspapers were scanned for texts regarding the banking crisis with a total 
58 texts being identified and analysed. Categories and themes were derived from the 
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meaning units identified and these were further analysed using the IFCs corporate 
governance framework. 
5.3 Conclusion 
        The meaning units derived from the data were used in answering the first 
research question, which was concerned with the direct actions of managers and 
shareholders, causing the collapse of their banks. The actions identified included: 
interrelated lending, loan approval without the necessary process, granting of loans 
earning no interest, lending to risky borrowers, breaching the single obligor limit, the 
use of depositors’ funds as personal funds, shareholder excessive control of managers, 
exaggerating investments, overstating  loans and advances to customers, fabricating 
investments, re-engineering capital, misuse of BoG liquidity support, use of bank 
funds to pay off obligations in related companies, infrequent board meetings, non-
executive directors disregarding their duties and the approval of large compensation 
packages. Excessive shareholder control was identified as one action that was largely 
connected to many other actions. Excessive shareholder control negatively affected 
lending practices, leading to non-performing loans and the inevitable collapse of the 
banks.  
         The second research question was concerned with analysing and categorizing 
the actions of managers and shareholders using the IFCs corporate governance 
framework. The 4 areas in which the actions could be categorized were: the structure 
and functioning of the board, the control environment and process, disclosure 
transparency and the treatment of minority shareholders. In each of these areas, the 
defunct banks struggled to meet the basic corporate governance practices.  
This study has successfully shed light on the corporate governance malpractices that 
led to collapse of seven Ghanaian banks between 2017 and 2018. 
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          The BoG’s commitment to better corporate governance practices is notable 
from its publication of a corporate governance directive. In auditing the operations of 
banks, the auditor should focus mainly on lending to related parties as this has the 
potential of causing serious ruins to banks. 
5.4 Recommendations for future studies 
Future studies should look to identify the corporate governance practices of 
well-performing Ghanaian banks so they can be juxtaposed with the practices of these 
failed banks. This may offer valuable insight to the regulator regarding aspects of the 
Ghanaian banking industry that require reforms. Additionally, future studies should 
inculcate the annual reports of banks in order to have a more complete view of the 
governance structure of the banks. 
 
5.5 Limitations of this study 
When undertaking a content analysis, it is generally recommended to have 
more than one researcher develop the categories for the study. This is intended to 
validate the categories derived while ensuring that all possible categories are 
captured. This study unfortunately did not implement this practice and thus, the 
validity and extensiveness of the data may be questioned.  
Secondly, the texts analysed in the content analysis revealed very little about 
the governance documentation of the banks. This made it impossible to analyse the 
banks’ practices in two areas of the IFC framework which are heavily dependent on 
these documents.   
  Finally, the non-availability of Ghanaian print media online meant all 
newspapers had to be scanned manually. A coding software could not be used in 
identifying the key words and quantify how often they appeared. All categorisation of 
texts had to be done manually, making the process more prone to error.  
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